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Chemerinsky: Government Duty to Protect

GOVERNMENT DUTY TO PROTECT: POSTDESHANEY DEVELOPMENTS
Erwin Chemerinsky'
Generally, when people are injured by the government,
lawyers often want to turn it into a constitutional § 19832 claim.
Moreover, lacking anything else in the Constitution, lawyers turn
to the Due Process Clause

When government inaction causes a

potential plaintiff to be injured, lawyers again want to turn it into a
constitutional claim, so they look to the Due Process Clause.4 The
United States Supreme Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, largely precluded such actions, but
the majority left open a few exceptions.'

It is interesting and

noteworthy that in the thirteen years since DeShaney, the Supreme
Court has largely avoided this set of issues, despite numerous
petitions for certiorari that could have clarified the area.6

To

Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of
Southern California Law School. His article is based on a transcript of remarks
given at the Practising Law Institute program on § 1983 Civil Rights Litigation.
242 U.S.C § 1983 (2003).
' U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1.
4 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989).
5 Id. at 192-202. The Court mentioned two possible exceptions: 1) if the
government is responsible for creating the danger, and 2) if someone is in
government custody and the person is unable to protect himself. Id.
6 See, e.g., Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1093 (1999); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 994 (1995); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied,498 U.S. 938 (1990).
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one must

recognize that certain patterns have begun to emerge in lower court
cases. Of course, no description can explain each and every one of
these cases, but there are some common themes.
The place to begin is with DeShaney itself.

Joshua

DeShaney was a four-year-old boy who was severely beaten by his
father and suffered irreversible brain damage.7 Joshua's guardian
sued the Department of Social Services, claiming its failure to
respond to complaints of child abuse over a two year period
resulted in Joshua losing his liberty interests without due process
of law.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected
this argument.9 The Court said that the government had no duty to
protect Joshua from his father."0 It rejected the claim that there
was a special relationship between the Department of Social
Services and Joshua that would create such a duty." According to

7 DeShaney, 489

U.S. at 193. As a result of the beating that Joshua sustained,

he is expected to spend the rest of his life in an institution for the profoundly
retarded. Id.
8 Id. at 191.

An argument that the Wisconsin child protection statute gave

Joshua an "entitlement" to receive protective services was also advanced. Id. at
195. The argument was based on the Court's decision in Bd. of Regents of State
Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Id. However, since this argument was

made for the first time on appeal, the Court declined to address it. Id.
91Id.
'Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 201-02.
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the Court, generally, the government has no duty to safeguard
2
people and protect them from privately inflicted harms.'

Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly invoked the distinction
between

negative

Constitution. 3

liberties

and affirmative

duties

in

the

The Court stated that the function of the

Constitution is to impose prohibitions on the government. 4

The

government cannot infringe upon the freedom of speech or the
freedom to exercise one's religion.

The government cannot

impose cruel and unusual punishment or deny a person equal
protection of the law."' These are considered negative liberties
because they are prohibitions on government action.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Constitution does
not generally impose affirmative burdens on the government, and
Joshua's case was no different. 6 The Court reasoned there might
be certain limited circumstances in which the government has a
duty to provide protection. 7 The Court specifically mentioned
two: 1) if the government is responsible for creating the danger and

12 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97.

"3Id. at 195-96.
'41d

Is Id. at 197-99.
16 Id. at 196.
'" DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99.
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2) if someone in government custody is unable to protect himself
or herself. 8
There were strong dissenting opinions in this case. The
most famous was Justice Blackmun's.

He lamented the fate of

poor four-year-old Joshua who had no one to protect him other
than the Department of Social Services, and it had failed to do so."
Justice Brennan, along with the other dissenters, questioned
Rehnquist's bright-line distinction between negative liberties and
affirmative duties..2 '

The dissenters explained that the most

significant difference between a negative and an affirmative duty is
the phrasing.'

More telling is that Joshua's claim could have been

phrased as being about negative liberties; the government violated
a prohibition on its acting in a way that endangered a child.2
Justice Blackmun stated that the government should be required to
23
provide protection in a circumstance like this.

8
'9
20

Id at 198-202.
Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 204-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that he would

have begun the analysis at the opposite direction, focusing on the action that the
Department of Social Services engaged in, rather than the inaction. Id. at 205.
2 Id. at 212 ("My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see
that inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can
result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it." ).
22 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("From this perspective,
the DeShaneys' claim is first and foremost about inaction ... the failure, here, of
respondents to take steps to protect Joshua ... and only tangentially about action
.. the establishment of a state program specifically designed to help children
like
2 Joshua.").
1 Id. at 212.
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There are many parts of the Constitution that are about
affirmative duties. The Fourth Amendment creates an affirmative
duty on the part of the government to get warrants before searches
or arrests. 4 The Fifth Amendment places an affirmative duty on
25
the police with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination.

The

Sixth

Amendment

is

all

about

affirmative

duties.26

Nonetheless, DeShaney is the touchstone for all subsequent
discussions about the affirmative duty to provide protection under
due process. The Court held that the government generally has no
duty to protect people from privately inflicted harms. 7
Pinder v. Johnson2 1

is a paradigm post-DeShaney case.

One way in which it is typical is that almost all post-DeShaney
30
'9
cases have truly tragic facts. They usually involve deaths, rapes,

24

U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "no person ...
shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
26 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."
27 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196-97.
28 54 F.3d at 1169.
29 See, e.g., Pinder,54 F.3d at 1169.
'( See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 583.
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or horrible injuries. 3 In Pinder,a woman who was harassed by her
ex-boyfriend called the police because she was scared for her life
and the lives of her children.32

She asked the police officer

whether the ex-boyfriend was going to be kept in custody. She
informed the officer that she was not going back to work if the
police were just going to take him to the station and release him.
The police assured her that she had nothing to be concerned about
because the ex-boyfiiend was going to stay in custody. She did go
back to work. The officers took the ex-boyfriend to the station and
quickly released him. After his release, he immediately went back
to her house and burned it down, killing her three children.33 She
sued, claiming that the police had enhanced and created the
danger."

She argued that she relied to her detriment on what the

officer said, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected that claim."

The Fourth Circuit held that the

government's duty to provide protection was only imposed when

31See,

e.g., Davis, 143 F.3d at 1021.

32

54 F.3d at 1172.

33

Id.

34 Id.

31Id.

at 1178-79.
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someone is physically in government custody.16 This is one of the
most restrictive interpretations of DeShaney. The court stated the
police had no obligation to protect her or her children, and their
representations did not change anything.37
Next, I would like to focus on the exceptions to DeShaney.
There are many ways of characterizing these exceptions. I would
divide them into two categories based on the two exceptions that
the Court recognized in DeShaney. The first exception is when the
government enhances the danger; the second is where a person is
literally in government custody:"
The first of these exceptions is where the government
enhances or creates the danger.

The most authoritative and

frequently cited case is Wood v. Ostrander"9 out of the Ninth
Circuit.

In Wood, the police stopped a motorist who was

exhibiting signs of driving while intoxicated.

The police

administered a field sobriety test, and it was clear that the driver
was drunk. They arrested the driver and took him to the station.
There was a female passenger who was not taken to the station.

36

id. at 1175.

3' Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175.
38 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-202.
39 879 F.2d at 583.
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The police took the keys to the car and left her alone on the side of
the road in what the lower court described as "a high crime area."
She accepted a ride from another motorist and she was raped. She
then sued the police.4"

The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the

woman, holding the police created the danger, and this case thus fit
into the exception carved out in DeShaney." The court expressly
used the language of "deliberate indifference," stating that the
police, by leaving her alone on the side of the road with no means
of transportation, were "deliberately indifferent" to her safety.42
Another case with similar facts which is also widely cited is
Davis v. Brady."3 In this case, the police arrested Davis for public
intoxication and disorderly conduct.

He was then taken to the

county jail facility, but it was full. The officer was ordered to
"release Davis at the county jail if he was not so drunk that he
would be a hazard to himself."'

The officer drove Davis to an

area outside the city, kicked him out of the car, and told him to find
his own ride home. As the drunken man staggered along the road,
he was hit by a car and rendered a quadriplegic. He then brought a
lawsuit against the police.45
40

The Sixth Circuit, like the Ninth

Id.at 586.

41Id.at 588, 590, 596.
42 Id. at 588.
41 143 F.3d at 1021.
44Id.

at 1023.

45 id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/6
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Circuit in Wood, concluded that the government could be held
liable and articulated a test that has been frequently relied on by
other courts. 6 The court stated that in order to have a claim after
DeShaney, two requirements have to be met. First, the government
has to have a duty to the individual, and such a duty is not easily
inferred.4 7 That is the lesson of DeShaney. In this case, the court
stated that there is such a duty because the police had put the
person at risk. 8 Second, the Sixth Circuit held the government has
to be "deliberately indifferent;" mere negligence is not enough. 9
In two 1986 cases, Daniels v. Williams" and Davidson v.
Cannon,5 the Supreme Court held that negligence is not enough
for a due process violation. The Court reasoned that a due process
violation generally requires an intentional, or at least a reckless,
government act, the latter seemingly synonymous with deliberate

6

4 1d. at

1027.
Id. at 1025. The court reasoned that although in DeShaney the state neither
created nor worsened the danger, "duty to protect can arise in a non-custodial
setting if the state does anything to render an individual more vulnerable to
danger." Id. (quoting Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir.
1994)).
48 Davis, 143 F.3d at 1026 (explaining that the fact that Davis' injuries
occurred after his release was not dispositive because "[w]hat is key is that the
defendant officers put Davis in a situation, while in custody, and allegedly
against his will, that caused his injuries.").
49 Id. at 1026 (where a government official is merely negligent in causing
injury to an inmate, there is no due process violation).
'0 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986).
5 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
47
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indifference. 2 In Davis, the Sixth Circuit found there was both a
duty and deliberate indifference. 3
The third case frequently cited is Munger v. Glasgow
Police Department."

Once again, this is a case that has tragic

facts. In this instance, a person was being rowdy in a bar and the
owner called the police. The police escorted the rowdy individual
outside the bar and took his car keys away. They would not allow
him back into the bar and would not allow him to get in his car. It
was clear to the police he was intoxicated, yet the police did
nothing to protect him. He was left outside overnight in the cold
and died of hypothermia." A lawsuit was brought, and the Ninth
Circuit ruled that after DeShaney, there could still be liability

6

The court phrased the test as, "whether [the government]
'affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger." ' '

It

held that the government has the duty to not put a person in harm
or to not make the person worse off than he or she was before. The
Ninth Circuit further stated that was exactly what the government
did in this instance, and thus there was a basis for liability. 8

52 Id.

53143 F.3d at 1027.
14 227 F.3d 1082 (9th
Cir. 2000).
" Id. at 1084-85.
61d.at 1089-90.
57 Id.at 1086 (quoting Wood, 879 F.2d at 589).
" Id. at 1087.
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From the plaintiffs perspective, perhaps the best phrasing
of the test post-DeShaney is in Currierv. Doran,59 yet another case
with tragic facts. In this case, a social worker transferred a child
from his mother to his father who then killed the child. There was
reason for the social worker to know that the father was potentially
abusive, even dangerously so. 6'

The Tenth Circuit held that

post-DeShaney, the government could still be held liable. 6' It used
a "but-for" causation analysis. The court stated, but-for the act of
the social worker, the child would not have been in danger or
suffered these harms.6 2 Normally, but-for causation is easy to find
in virtually any of these cases. Even in DeShaney, there was butfor causation; but-for the inattention of the Department of Social
Services, Joshua DeShaney likely would not have suffered the
harms he did. Of course, in Currierv. Doran, it was not just butfor causation; the Tenth Circuit also emphasized that the harm was
foreseeable and the Department of Social Services had been
deliberately indifferent.63
I think from a plaintiffs perspective, this Tenth Circuit
case is useful, but many other courts have rejected but-for

"
242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1019 (2001).
60
id at 909-10.
"1Id. at 919.
6
2 Id at 918.
63 Id. at 922.
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causation as insufficient. Terry B. v. Gilkey64 is an example of one
such case. In this instance, there was a transfer of a child from
foster care to an aunt and uncle. The child was abused, and a
lawsuit was brought. The court concluded that the government
could not be held liable because it could not be shown that the
harms were foreseeable, nor could it be shown that there was
deliberate indifference." There are hundreds of cases in which the
courts have articulated the test for state-enhanced danger in
varying ways.66 Moreover,

the

Seventh

Circuit

said

that

state-created dangers are really about whether the government put
the person, in essence, in a "snake pit." If the government puts a
person in a "snake pit," then the government is responsible.67
More generally, in order for a plaintiff to succeed, three
requirements must be met.6" First, there must be some government
229 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 682, 684.
66 See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 588 (phrasing the test in terms of "deliberate
64
61

indifference"); Davis, 143 F.3d at 1021, 1024 (phrasing the test in terms of
having dual requirements: 1) there must be a duty and 2) the government must
have been deliberately indifferent); Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086 (phrasing the test
as whether the government did something affirmative to enhance the danger);
Currier; 242 F.3d at 918-19 (phrasing the test as a but-for causation); Terry B.,
229 F.3d at 684 (phrasing the test in terms of whether the state action shocks the
conscience).
67 See, e.g., Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982) ("If the
state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as
much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.").
68 Wood, 879 F.2d at 586; Davis, 143 F.3d at 1021; Munger, 227 F.3d
at 1082;
Currier,242 F.3d at 905.
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action. Normally these are cases where the government action is
leaving a person on the side of the road or transferring the custody
of a child.69 Second, it must be proven that the risk to the person
was actually foreseeable in light of the government action." It has
to be a situation where there is a foreseeable increase in danger as
a result of the government's action.

Third, there has to be

deliberate indifference on the part of the government.7' Again, I
emphasize that pure negligence is not enough.72 These are hard
requirements to meet, but I think that the vast majority of
state-created danger cases can be explained by focusing on these
three factors. If the plaintiff can meet these requirements, then the
plaintiff can win. If the plaintiff fails to meet any one of them,
then the defendant will prevail.
The other exception that is recognized in the DeShaney line
of cases is where somebody is in government custody.

As I

mentioned, Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke of this exception in

69

See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 586 (police left plaintiff by side of the road);

Davis, 143 F.3d at 1023 (police left plaintiff by side of the road); Munger, 227
F,3d at 1084-85 (police left plaintiff outside of bar); Currier, 242 F.3d at 905
(defendant transferred custody of child to father who had allegedly previously
neglected children).
70 See, e.g., Terry B, 229 F.3d at 684.
7, See, e.g., Wood, 879 F.2d at 583; Davis, 143 F.3d at 1021.
72 See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
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The Court said that this is the only exception to

DeShaney.7" Of course, if a person is in custody, then he or she is
limited in the ability to protect himself or herself. The government
then has responsibility.
government's

The initial cases concerning the

duty to those in custody normally involved

prisoners. In Estelle v. Gamble,74 the Court held that the prison has
a duty to provide medical care to inmates and that deliberate
indifference is a basis for liability under the Eighth Amendment."
The most important and famous prisoner case is Farmerv.
Brennan.76

A prisoner had begun to undergo a sex-change

procedure before going into a federal penitentiary.

The prison

officials did nothing to protect him from other inmates, and he was
repeatedly raped and sodomized."
The Supreme Court stated that prison officials are liable if
they are deliberately indifferent; however, the Court reasoned that
in the prisoner context, deliberate indifference is a subjective test

73 DeShaney,

489 U.S. at 198-200 (reasoning that DeShaney never actually
stated the "state created danger theory" as an exception to the inaction rule).
74429 U.S. 97 (1976).

Id. at 104-05 (reasoning that when a person is in custody, the state, at the
very least, must provide basic medical needs).
76 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
77 Id. at 829-30.
75
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that looks to the state of mind of the prison officials.78 Usually, in
other contexts, when courts talk about deliberate indifference, the
standard is usually an objective test.79

In this context, I see

deliberate indifference as being an objective test.

I was just

speaking of deliberate indifference in the post-DeShaney cases and
how I view it as being objective in nature. However, custody cases
are different.

In these cases dealing with prisoners' rights,

deliberate indifference is viewed as subjective in nature."
objective

test looks

circumstances.

to the reasonable

The

officer under the

The subjective test looks to the state of mind of

these officers.
I have identified three areas where the Court has dealt with
custody.

Certainly, this does not account for all of the custody

cases, but probably picks up the vast majority of them. The first
area is the foster care cases, and there are a great many of them.'
In my opinion, the foster care cases seem to come down to the
following: If the government places a child in foster care, then the

71

Id. at 837.

79

See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

80 See, e.g,. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
81 See, e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); White v. Chambliss,

112 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1997); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989).
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However, if the child is

privately placed in foster care by his or her parents, then the
government does not have a duty to that child.83
4
One such case is the Third Circuit case, Niccini v. Morra,"

from a couple of years ago. In this case, the state took a child
away from its parents and placed the child in foster care. 5 Here,
the Third Circuit expressly analogized this to the state putting a
person in prison or institutionalizing the individual.

The Court

reasoned that when the state takes such action, it creates a duty on
the part of the state and distinguishes the situation from
DeShaney."6 However, as we all learned in first year Torts class,
duty is not enough; in order to have liability, there must be a
breach of that duty.
White v. Chambliss,"7 from the Fourth Circuit, gives us
some sense of what the standard is for breach of duty. 8

White

involved the government placing a child in foster care, and the
question was under what circumstances the government was
82 See, e.g., Niccini, 212 F.3d at 807.
83 See, e.g., Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476.
84 212 F.3d at 798.
5 Id. at 801. The child was then sexually abused by the foster care custodians.

Id. at 804. As it turns out, the foster care provider had been convicted of sexual
abuse of a minor in the past, which should have been discovered. Id. at 804 n.5.
86 Id. at 807, 808-09.
87 112 F.3d at 731.
88 Id. at 737 (reasoning that the duty is breached only if the state officials
"were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger").
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liable. 9 The Fourth Circuit stated that a plaintiff has to prove
"deliberate indifference" on the part of the government; it is not
enough that the child was placed in foster care and there was harm
to the child. This means that a potential plaintiff must prove that
the government was "deliberate[ly] indifferent" with regard to
foreseeable harms.9" There are a large number of cases involving
private placement of children into foster care that consistently
reject government liability.9' The Milburn 2 case is typical of this.
Also, in situations involving private placement, the Fourth Circuit
flat out rejects any duty of the government to provide protection
under those circumstances.93 The Fourth Circuit basically relied on
DeShaney.
A second area where DeShaney's custody principle is
applied is in the school context.94 These cases usually involve a
student who was terribly injured while at school, and the parents
brought a claim arguing that, as a result of the state's requirement

89

Id. at 734-35.

90

Id. at 737.
91 See, e.g., Milburn, 871 F.2d at 474; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301
(4th Cir. 2001); Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215 (4th
Cir. 1989); Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Va. 1991).
92 871 F.2d at 474.
9' Id. at 476.
94 See, e.g., Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d at 701 (7th Cir.

2002); Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2001); Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d
845 (6th Cir. 1999), Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir.
1997).
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that the child be in school, the state has a duty to protect the child.9"
The reality is that the parents and the children lose in the vast
majority of these cases. Overwhelmingly, courts have refused to
find a duty on the part of the school to provide protection.96
I have listed several of these cases which are typical
representative cases.

Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School

District" is one of the most frequently cited cases. It involved a
student who was raped by a custodian. The parents argued that
because the State of Texas requires students to be in school seven
hours a day, there exists a duty to protect students. They alleged
that when a parent sends a child to school, the parent has a
reasonable expectation that the school will protect the child.
However, the court held there is no duty on the part of the school
to provide protection to the student, and the school has no liability
with regard to this rape.98

95 Doe, 113 F.3d at 1412.
96

See, e.g., Doe, 113 F.3d at 1416 (finding that the recognition of"a potential

for § 1983 liability based on egregious hiring decisions does not entail
endorsement of the view that defendants such as the Hillsboro Independent
School District have a duty to protect students from threats from other sorts of
third parties."); Martin, 295 F.3d at 712 (stating that the plaintiff "did not
attempt suicide during school hours or on school premises. Thus, the plaintiffs
can only succeed if they establish that the school had a duty to protect
[decedent] from suicide after the school day ended."); Shrum, 249 F.3d at 781
(finding that "public schools do not have a duty to protect schoolchildren from
private violence").
97 113 F.3d at 1412.
9' ld. at 1414-15.
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Moreover,

the

Seventh

Circuit,

in

Martin

v.

Shawano-Gresham School District,99 provided another example of
this.

This case involved a student who was suspended from

school.

The school had reason to believe that the student was

depressed. The school did nothing to help the student, but instead
she was suspended and sent home. She then committed suicide.'
The argument was that the state created the danger and had an
affirmative duty to protect the student. It was then argued that the
"state created danger" theory is enough to create a duty on the part
of the school to provide protection. The Seventh Circuit rejected
that argument, stating that there was no duty on the part of the
school in such circumstances. It explicitly applied authority from
its jurisdiction. 1o1

There are many cases that involve students being injured by
other students.'

2

The question under those circumstances is

whether the government has a duty to provide protection. I refer to
Shrum v. Kluck

°3

as a representative case where the court held

there is no duty on the part of the school to protect the student from

99 295 F.3d at 701.

'oo Id. at 704-05.

o' Id. at 708 n.6.
102

See, e.g., Shrum, 249 F.3d at 773; Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7

F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech.
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
103 249 F.3d at 781.
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private acts of violence. Similarly, in DeShaney, the Court held
there was no duty on the part of the government to protect Joshua
DeShaney from violence at the hands of his father."°4
It could be argued that when it comes to special education
students, there might be a special duty, even if no such duty exists
for other students.

However, in Soper v. Hoben, °5 the Sixth

Circuit held that even in the context of special education students,
there is no duty. Generally, the plaintiffs in these school cases lose
the vast majority of times, but there are certainly some instances
where courts have been willing to provide protection

for

07
students." 6 There is a First Circuit case, Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse,1

which states that if the school's conduct "shocks the conscience,"
meaning the school's behavior is "outrageous," then there might be
a basis for liability.

However, it is a difficult standard for a

plaintiff to prevail under.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a duty for
schools in a particular area, specifically with regard to sexual
harassment claims under Title IX.'

Educational institutions that

receive federal funds are covered by Title IX. In this context, Title
'04489 U.S. at 195.
'05 195 F.3d 845, 852-53 (6th Cir. 1999).
106 See, e.g., Doe, 113 F.3d at 1412; Martin, 295 F.3d at 701; Shrum, 249 F.3d
at 773; Soper, 195 F.3d at 845.
107 175 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 1999).
108 See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/6

20

Chemerinsky: Government Duty to Protect

G OVERNMENT D UTY TO PR0 TECT

2003]

IX states that institutions that receive federal funds cannot
discriminate on the basis of gender.' °

In Gebser v. Lago Vista

School District," the Supreme Court held that a school district
could be held liable under Title IX for sexual harassment by a
teacher of a student when there is proof of "deliberate
indifference."
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,"' the
Supreme Court considered a school's duty with regard to peer
sexual harassment. The Court stated that the school could be held
liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment.

It said that a

plaintiff must prove that the peer sexual "harassment ...is so
severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively bars
'1
the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit." 2"

Furthermore, a plaintiff must also prove there was "deliberate
indifference" on the part of the school official. This means that the
school officials actually knew and did not take appropriate action
in light of that knowledge." 3 From a plaintiffs perspective, it is a
difficult test to prove, but it certainly opens the door more than the
usual due process claims against the schools.

09 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (1)(2003).
"' 524 U.S. at 284.
...
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
112

Id. at

633.

113
Id.
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The third and final area of custody cases is where a police
officer witnesses other officers abusing an individual." 4 A clear
example of this is the 1991 videotape of Rodney King being beaten
by Los Angeles police officers while the other officers simply
stood there and watched. The focus is on whether a police officer
watching excessive force by another officer is under a duty to do
something about it. The cases in this area hold that the officer
watching the excessive force is under a duty to act."'
In Anderson v. Branen,"6 the Second Circuit stated that,
"[iut is widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an
affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of
citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in
Similarly, in Hale v. Townley," 7 the court

their presence."

reiterated the principle that "an officer who is present at the scene
and does not take reasonable steps to protect a suspect from
another officer's use of excessive force may be held liable under
Section 1983."

However, in Cunningham v. Gates,"8 the Ninth

Circuit clarified when police officers have such a duty. In this

'14
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000), Hale v.
Townley, 45 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1995), Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir.
1994).
116

17 F.3d at 557.

l745 F.3d at 919.
118 229 F.3d at 1289.
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case, the court stated that police officers watching other officers
using excessive force can be held liable only if they have a realistic
opportunity to intercede and prevent the harm. However, no such
opportunity existed in this case, and as such, no liability could be
imposed."'
The final area I would like to discuss is the ability to use
equal protection as an alternative to due process in failure to
protect cases. Many clever lawyers realized that DeShaney closed
the door on due process claims, so they turned to the Equal
Protection Clause. The area where this is most frequently seen is
in the domestic violence context where there is a long and tragic
history of police not providing adequate protection to victims of
domestic violence. 2 '

The argument is that police discriminate

against victims of domestic violence as compared to victims of
other kinds of violence.

Victims of domestic violence are

overwhelmingly women, so the argument is framed as gender
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 2
What is interesting in this area is that many lower courts
have recognized, in theory, that such a claim is available.'

119
120

22

Those

Id.

See, e.g., Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2000); Ricketts v.

City 1of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1994).
12 Shipp, 234
122

F.3d at 911.

See, e.g., Shipp, 234 F.3d at 912-13; Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 779.
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courts reason that equal protection is not covered by the DeShaney
rules. In reality, however, it is very hard to find instances where
plaintiffs succeed under this equal protection theory. I think the
reason is that aspects of equal protection law make it hard to
succeed in these circumstances. First, there has to be a showing of
purposeful discrimination. In Washington v. Davis,2 1 the Supreme
Court held discriminatory impact is not enough to show an equal
protection violation; there has to be a showing of purposeful
discrimination. The Supreme Court extended its holding to cover
gender discrimination in PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney.'24 In
Feeney, the Court considered the Massachusetts statute that gave
preference in hiring for state jobs to veterans.

A substantial

proportion of employable men of the state were veterans, but less
than one percent of employable women were veterans. There was
a foreseeable discriminatory impact against women. The Supreme
25
Court held that discriminatory impact alone is not enough.'

There has to be proof that the government did the act with the
desire to bring about that consequence.'

6

It is hard to show

purposeful discrimination in the context of equal protection
DeShaney type claims.
123

426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

12'442 U.S. 256 (1979).
121 Id. at 279.
126 Id. at 260 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 260).
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The other obstacle for potential plaintiffs is the difficulty of
proving gender discrimination in light of some Supreme Court
decisions. What I am referring to is the Supreme Court's decision
in Geduldig v. Aiello. 27 In Geduldig, California had a statute that
provided coverage

in its disability plan for almost every

imaginable medical condition, but excluded pregnancy.
plaintiff

argued

that

excluding

pregnancy

discrimination in violation of equal protection.' 28

was

The
gender

Justice Potter

Stewart, writing for the majority, specifically rejected that
argument.'

9

Justice Stewart wrote that there are two categories of

individuals, pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.

He

reasoned that although the category of pregnant persons is only
women, the category of non-pregnant persons includes both
women and men.' 31 Justice Stewart stated that since there are
women in both categories, it cannot be gender discrimination. 3 '
In addition, the Supreme Court has invoked this argument
in the context of domestic violence, and it becomes very difficult
to have an equal protection violation. If a potential plaintiff argues
that the government is treating domestic violence differently than

127

417 U.S. 484 (1974).

128

Id at 486.

129

Id. at 494-95.

"0 Id. at 497 n.20.
131id.
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other kinds of violence, a court would likely conclude that women
are in both categories.

Therefore, no equal protection violation

could occur. Lower courts have rejected equal protection claims
with regard to both of these theories.
Columbia' is a representative decision.

Ricketts v. City of
In this case, the Eighth

Circuit held that in order to prove an equal protection violation in
the

gender

context,

there

must

be

proof of intentional

discrimination based on gender, and it must be shown that the
discrimination was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. 3'
Similarly, in Hayden v. Grayson,"4 the First Circuit
specifically rejected the equal protection challenge based on
discriminatory enforcement. The court reasoned that the plaintiff
failed to prove the police intended to treat all domestic crimes
differently from non-domestic crimes, all crimes against children
differently from crimes against adults, and all sexual abuse crimes
differently from nonsexual crimes.'

Moreover, another recent

representative case is Jones v. Union County'36 from the Sixth
Circuit. The court also rejected an equal protection challenge for
the failure of the police to provide protection in the domestic

132 36 F.3d at 775.
131
Id.at 781.
114134

F.3d 449, 456 (1st Cir. 1998).

' Id. at 454.

136

296 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002).
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violence context. While there is certainly the possibility of an
equal protection violation, provided the above requirements are
met, lower courts have generally found that the requirements were
not met.'37
In sum, it is very difficult to show liability on the part of
the government for failure to protect.

In order to do so, the

requirements mentioned above must all be met. First, it must be
shown that the government had a duty, either because the
government created the danger or the person is in custody.
Second, the harm suffered by the plaintiff must have been
foreseeable. Third, it must be shown that the government acted in
a deliberately indifferent manner. Only if all of these requirements
are met can there be liability imposed.

37

'

Id. at 421.
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